Publications/Accepted papers
Spillovers in State Capacity Building: Evidence from the Digitization of Land Records in Pakistan [latest version] [VoxDev]
(w/ Clement Minaudier (City University)) Forthcoming, American Economic Review, 2026
Abstract: Digitization reforms have been hailed as an effective way to strengthen state capacity. However, digitization can also disrupt the organization of bureaucracies. Using a unique administrative dataset on agricultural taxation and surveys of local bureaucrats from Punjab, Pakistan, we show that digitization reforms can have unintended consequences for state capacity. We exploit the staggered rollout of the digitization of land records in Punjab to show that digitization had a negative effect on tax collection. The fall in taxes was not due to a decrease in the tax base. Instead, digitization affected the bureaucracy's capacity to collect taxes. The paper thus sheds light on the importance of understanding state capacity development from an organizational perspective.
Informal fiscal systems in developing countries [NBER version][Ungated version]
(w/ Clement Minaudier (City University) and Sandip Sukhtankar (UVA))
Accepted, Journal of Development Economics, 2025
Abstract: Governments in developing countries have low fiscal capacity yet face pressures to provide public goods and services, leading them to rely on various unusual fiscal arrangements. We uncover one such arrangement - informal fiscal systems that rely on local bureaucrats to fund the delivery of public goods and services - cataloging its existence in at least 20 countries. Using survey data and government accounts from Pakistan, we show that public officials are expected to cover funding gaps in public services and they do so, at least partially, through extracted bribes. We develop a model of bureaucratic agency to explore when governments benefit from sustaining such systems and investigate their implications for welfare and bureaucrat selection. Informal fiscal systems are more likely to arise when corruption is widespread but public service delivery is relatively easy to monitor. While they provide an effective second-best solution in the presence of moral hazard and adverse selection, they can distort the effective incidence of the tax burden, reduce the incentives of governments to fight corruption, and legitimize bribe-taking. This makes corruption more widespread and thus makes informal systems self-reinforcing.
Meritocracy in a Bureaucracy [Ungated version] [Published version] [VoxDev]
Journal of Development Economics, 2025
Abstract: This paper examines the Pakistan Administrative Services (PAS), a bureaucracy in a high-corruption, low-transparency environment, to assess whether discretion in promotion decisions allows for the use of private information on bureaucrats' abilities. Using unique data on junior bureaucrats' abilities and their social ties with senior officials, the study finds evidence of meritocratic promotions: senior officials are more likely to promote high-ability juniors over those with social ties, despite limited explicit incentives. I also provide evidence indicating the circumstances under which meritocratic promotions are more likely to take place. These findings suggest that discretion can lead to improved outcomes, even in settings marked by pervasive corruption.
Team Size and Diversity [Ungated version] [Published version]
(w/ Alexia Delfino (Bocconi University) and Brais Álvarez Pereira (Universidade NOVA SBE))
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2024
Abstract: We analyse the relationship between performance, team diversity and size. We first propose a model with knowledge spillovers in production, which predicts that the effect of having a person with a diverse knowledge set within a team increases with the size of the team. We experimentally test the model by randomly assigning students to solve knowledge questions in teams of different sizes, with or without a person with a diverse knowledge set. We find that the benefit of having a diverse rather than a same-skill colleague is greater in larger teams relative to small teams. While this result holds for male students irrespective of the gender of the skill-diverse colleague, for female students it is empirically satisfied only in gender homogeneous teams. These results have implications for how organizations can design their teams to maximize knowledge flows and performance.
Working Papers
Screen Now, Save Later? The Trade-Off between Administrative Ordeals and Fraud [NBER version][latest version]
(w/ Daniel Gingerich (UVA) and Sandip Sukhtankar (UVA))
Revise and Resubmit (second round), American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 2026
Abstract: Screening requirements are common features of fraud and corruption mitigation efforts around the world. Yet imposing these requirements involves trade-offs between higher administrative costs, delayed benefits, and exclusion of genuine beneficiaries on one hand and lower fraud on the other. We examine these trade-offs in one of the largest economic relief programs in US history: the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP). Employing a database that includes nearly 11.5 million PPP loans, we assess the impact of screening by exploiting temporal variation in the documentation standards applied to loan applications for loans of different values. We find that screening significantly reduced the incidence and magnitude of various measures of loan irregularities that are indicative of fraud, without deterring screened borrowers. Moreover, our analysis reveals that a subset of borrowers with a checkered history strategically reduced their loan application amounts in order to avoid being subjected to screening. Borrowers without a checkered history engaged in this behavior at a much lower rate, implying that the documentation requirement reduced fraud without imposing an undue administrative burden on legitimate firms. All told, our estimates imply that screening led to a reduction in losses due to fraud equal to at least $832 million.
Bureaucratic Deliberation and Performance: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Benin [Draft available on request]
(w/ Leonard Wantchekon (Princeton) and Lazare Kovo (Emory))
Abstract: Bureaucratic performance depends not only on individual incentives and ability but also on shared expectations about how others within the organization behave. This paper examines whether such collective beliefs can be shifted through structured deliberation among bureaucrats. We conducted an institutional experiment with 20 municipal administrations in Benin, where bureaucrats in treated municipalities held a series of meetings to deliberate on information from audit reports, surveys of bureaucrats, and citizen feedback, while control municipalities continued with business as usual. Using administrative audit data from 2014 to 2019, we find that deliberation increased municipal performance scores by 6.8 percentage points (8.7 percent relative to the control mean), with effects concentrated among municipalities with below-average baseline performance. Citizen experiences of service delivery also improved modestly but not significantly. Survey evidence indicates that deliberation altered bureaucrats’ beliefs about enforcement and reduced trust in colleagues and the municipal council, consistent with the idea that lower interpersonal trust can limit collusive behavior in low-accountability environments (Tirole, 1986). The results highlight deliberation as a low-cost management practice that enhances bureaucratic performance by reshaping collective expectations and as a promising form of institutional experimentation for strengthening state capacity.
Designing the State [Draft available on request]
(w/ Capt. Retd. Ikram-ul-Haq (PLRA))
Abstract: How should governments organize frontline bureaucracies to improve service delivery? In this paper, we study whether service delivery improves when a public service is run by several competing government offices rather than a single office. We examine this question using the universe of land transaction data from Punjab, Pakistan, comprising over 14.5 million transactions from 2018–2025. Exploiting the staggered introduction of competing service centers in a difference-in-differences framework, we compare the incumbent center’s speed of processing land records in villages that gain a competitor to those that do not. Entry substantially improves delivery: the incumbent center’s processing time falls by roughly 15 percent. Competition operates on both intensive and extensive margins: the incumbent loses market share, and total village transaction volume rises by 11 percent. The response, however, is non-monotonic. While the first entrant generates large gains, a second entrant erodes them. In triopoly markets, additional entry does not increase total village transaction volume, consistent with saturation. Processing times at the incumbent rise relative to the duopoly case, offsetting most of the initial efficiency gains from competition. These results show that how the state organizes service provision is a central determinant of public service delivery: competition can improve performance, but excessive fragmentation can undo those gains.
Selected Work in Progress (advanced stage)
Advisor Gender and Performance (w/ Alexia Delfino (Bocconi University), Clement Minaudier (City University), Brais Álvarez Pereira (Universidade NOVA SBE) and Shamyla Chaudry (Lahore School of Economics))
[Status: experiment complete, analysis]
Selected Work in Progress (pilot stage)
Political Economy of Urban Waste Recycling (w/ Asim I. Khwaja (Harvard) and Shing-Yi Wang (Wharton, UPenn))
Technology and Trust in the State (w/ Claudio Ferraz (UBC) and Capt. Retd. Ikram-ul-Haq (PLRA))
Coordination among Female Entrepreneurs (w/ Leonard Wantchekon (Princeton) & Suman Zahra (independent researcher))
Colorism and the Marriage Market (w/ Siwan Anderson (UBC) and Ritika Gupta (UVA))
Permanent Working Paper
Charitable donations and violence: Evidence from Pakistan
Abstract: This paper suggests a new channel of violence: the charitable donations channel. I exploit the rules of religious donations coupled with variations in the international price of gold/silver to arrive at a source of exogenous variation for donations. Using district-year level data on average household donations and terrorist attacks in Pakistan for the years 2001-2013, I find that donations increase the probability of a terrorist attack by 79% and the number of terrorist attacks by 30. All the effect of donations appears to work through an increase in suicide attacks as a specific terrorism tactic. All other tactics appear unaffected.
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Based on the MRes paper: The Economic Causes of Terror: Evidence from Rainfall Variation and Terrorist Attacks in Pakistan [click here]